The increasingly violent response of the Regime inflamed the opposition, leading to additional protests and the emergence of an armed opposition. By late July 2011, senior Syrian Arab Army officials defected to form the Free Syrian Army (FSA), with armed opposition groups coalescing in Homs. Over the summer, defected officers and soldiers that had fled to Homs, as well as volunteers from the city itself, formed an opposition that gradually began to take control of some city areas, initially in the form of defensive groups. 

As the activity of armed opposition groups began to increase in Homs, the CCMC retaliated by strengthening joint state military/security operations.

In July 2011 the CCMC convened a meeting focusing on Homs to examine “the security situations … and appropriate methods to handle” it, thereby directing the Security Committee in Homs to “Conduct inspection in the city districts. Start immediately from the eastern city districts and arrest the wanted persons; Search for the perpetrators of crimes and hand them over to the judiciary”. Demonstrating the high importance that the Regime leadership placed on quashing the Homs uprising, the head of NSB itself was ordered to “supervise, monitor and provide necessary assistance” for the execution of this task. 

The Homs Security Committee responded with its own set of proposals on 20 July 2011 with the CCMC responding on the very same day, where it decided to: 

At the end of the month the CCMC reported that a large “inspection and investigation campaign” was being conducted in Al-Bayyada in the north of Homs, leading to the arrest of 122 people.

The Head of the NSB continued to issue stronger instructions to the heads of the security branches, ordering them to carry out daily joint security-military campaigns to “cleanse” relevant neighbourhoods by arresting individuals from the targeted groups and then maintaining control of those areas. Those arrested were to be interrogated by Joint Investigative Committees (JIC) consisting of representatives from each of the four security branches plus the Criminal Security Branch. The interrogation ‘results’ were to be used to pursue new targets and arrest more members of the opposition’s local coordination committees. This was reinforced by a surge of troops, including the deployment of five battalions of riot police by the Minister of the Interior. 

Despite the increased security measures, the situation continued to deteriorate through the summer. In response, the Regime further escalated their security response. They did this by attempting to rectify perceived weaknesses, reorganising the security apparatus and command structures it utilised and by formulating, disseminating, and targeting particular groups within the opposition. National level plans were ordered – and drawn up – to target demonstrators, supporters, coordinators, funders, media activists, as well as armed groups who were arrested and detained in their thousands.  Special attention was to be given to opposition media activists as well as the media reporting on the conflict, a decision which would have tragic effects in Homs, culminating in the February 2012 attack on the Baba Amro Media Centre. 

And yet, Homs remained a hot zone requiring the specific attention of the CCMC which continued to evaluate the situation in the governorate and adjust its reactions. At the end of August, one such meeting was held in which the CCMC further emphasised its control of the events unfolding in Homs deciding that:  

It is important to note here that the Head of the Political Security Department had been dispatched not just to supervise the role of the security bodies but to actively “lead” them. The period that followed saw an increase in the number of military/security raids in the governorate with significant fighting between armed opposition and Regime breaking out. 

Nevertheless, neighbourhoods like Baba Amro slipped further from the Regime’s control.  By the end of October, the CCMC was so closely involved that it directly supervised some of the “investigation and search” operations in Baba Amro and Jouret Al-Arayes. A CCMC daily report on the security situation in Homs dated 31 October noted that: 

The operation lasted several days as the CCMC daily report from 03 November indicated that an exchange of fire in Baba Amro the day earlier resulted in the death of seven Syrian army personnel. The media reports of that day referenced heavy bombardment of Homs by tanks.